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the turbulent nature of recent German history, studies of
postwar German memory understandably have focused upon the
GIVEN issue of Vergangenheitsbewaltigung?the
difficult process of "coming
to terms" with the historical experience of the Third Reich and the Sec?
ond World War. This topic's magnitude has rightly inspired considerable
scholarly attention but, at the same time, it has also had the unintended
effect of overshadowing
other German struggles with memory.1 In recent
this state of affairs has begun to change. As the epochal
years, however,
events of 1989-90 have forced Germans to confront still another burdensome

historical

of communism?the

increasing calls for a
better
or
for
have,
worse, broken the
Vergangenheitsbewaltigung
of
the
Third
Reich
hold
on
the
nation's
historical con?
monopolistic
sciousness.2 Historians have already begun to speculate about the likely
legacy?that

"second"

1. Indeed, as some observers have pointed out, this is implicit in the very composition
of the term Vergangenheitsbewaltigung
itself. Its meaning, roughly "coming to terms with the
past," has reduced an expansive term?the past-?to but twelve years of German history.
See Bernd Hey, "Die NS-Prozesse?Versuch einer juristischen Vergangenheitsbewaltigung,"
Geschichtein Wissenschaftund Unterricht6 (1981): 331. Most recent studies have been con?
servative critiques of the concept. See Manfred Kittel, Die Legendevon der zweiten Schuld:
in derAra Adenauer(Berlin, 1993); Michael Wolffsohn, KeineAngst
Vergangenheitsbewaltigung
vor Deutschland!(Erlangen, 1990), 96-110; EckhardJesse, "'Vergangenheitsbewaltigung'in
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," Der Staat 26, no. 4 (1987): 539-65. See also, Peter Graf
Kielmansegg,LangeSchatten:VomUmgangderDeutschenmit dernationabozialistischen
Vergangenheit
und Westintegration
(Berlin, 1989) and Ulrich Brochhagen,NachNiirnberg:Vergangenheitsbewaltigung
in der Ara Adenauer(Hamburg, 1994).
2. Conservatives have taken up the call for the second Vergangenheitsbewaltigung.
See
Karlheinz Weissmann, Riickrufin die Geschichte(Berlin, 1992). Christa Hoffmann, Stunden
Null? Vergangenheitsbewaltigung
in Deutschland,1945 und 1989 (Bonn, 1992). Martin Jay's
"Once More an Inability to Mourn? Reflections on the Left Melancholy of Our Time,"
GermanPoliticsand Society27 (Fall 1992), offers a view from a different perspective.
CentralEuropeanHistory, vol. 30, no. 2, 221?252
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course of this new Vergangenheitsbewaltigungby comparing it to the experience
of coming to terms with the legacy of Nazism.3 Although this compara?
tive perspective promises to better our understanding of both dictatorial
eras, other historical comparisons may be equally useful. By examining
the Germans' attempts to "work through"
history, a broader understanding

earlier periods of their nation's
of German collective memory
and its possible future development
may be gained.
One area of considerable interest is the highly politicized
collective
This
of
abortive
revolutions
of
1918-1919.
brief pe?
Germany's
memory
riod constitutes one of the most turbulent eras in recent German history.
burdened

Beginning with the collapse of the monarchy and the revolutionary proclamation of a republican form of government,
what initially appeared to
be a peaceful transition of power soon degenerated into bloodshed with
the ensuing outbreak and violent suppression of radical left-wing attempts
In view of the dramatic nature of these events, it is no
that
they occupy an important place in the collective memory of
surprise
The difficulties that succeeding generations have had in
Germans.
many
with
the
memory of this era, in turn, attest to its historical im?
dealing
at revolution.

and contemporary relevance. Indeed, the memory of this revo?
lutionary era may well even have implications for the future development
of the second Vergangenheitsbewaltigung in a newly reunified Germany. Al?
though the "working through" of the left-wing, revolutionary history of
portance

the German Democratic Republic is a topic that
only by the next generation of historians, hints
may emerge by analyzing the manner in which
tradition have evolved in
German revolutionary
An excellent demonstration of the controversial
of 1918-1919

in German

collective

memory

will be examined

in full

as to its possible
earlier episodes

course
in the

collective

memory.
of
the
revolutions
place
can be found in the city of

(apart from Berlin) of revolutionary
after 1918, Munich was the site of traumatic events whose place
in local memory has long been divisive. Already in the reactionary early
the era of revolution had become suryears of the Weimar Republic,
Munich.

As one of the main hotbeds

ferment

rounded by legend and "distorted . . . until it was no longer recognizable."4 In the decades that have followed, both the revolutions of 1918-1919
and the figure most closely associated with them, Kurt Eisner, have con3. Bernd Faulenbach,MarkusMeckel, HermannWeber, eds., Die ParteihatteimmerRecht?
Aufarbeitungvon Geschichteund Folgen der SED-Diktatur (Essen, 1994); Gotthard Jasper,
"Vergangenheitsbewaltigung':Historische Erfahrungenund politische Voraussetzungen,"in
Clemens Burrichter and Giinter Schodl, Ohne Erinnerungkeine Zukunft!Zur Aufarbeitung
von Vergangenheit
in einigeneuropaischen
unsererTage (Cologne, 1992), 17-31;
Gesellschaften
Jurgen Habermas,"Die Last der doppelten Vergangenheit,"Die Zeit, 13 May 1994, p. 54.
4. Eberhard Kolb, "Foreword," in Revolutionund Rdterepublik
in Munchen,1918/19 in
ed., GerhardSchmolze (Munich, 1978), 9-10.
Augenzeugenberichte,
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to spark dissension. So much so that the controversy surrounding
marking of the events' 75th anniversary prompted hyperbolic
era of
comparisons to a Bavarian "historians' debate."5 The revolutionary
1918-1919
has remained a politically sensitive issue not merely in the city

tinued

the recent

state of Bavaria, whose current,
as
a
Freistaat
can be traced back to the
jealously-held
republican identity
of
in
The
unsettled
relationship toward the revolutions
question.
period
in Munich and throughout Bavaria thus reflects the existence
1918-1919
how this
of insecurities in both local and regional identity. Examining
of Munich

but also within

the entire

period of history has evolved in the collective memory of the citizens of
postwar Munich, in turn, can shed light on the present as well as the past.
One of the most useful ways of analyzing the local memory of the
revolutionary era involves examining the city's monuments that commemorate
it. Recent scholarship on collective memory has confirmed the value of
Ever since the pioneering French scholar of collec?
studying monuments.
tive memory, Maurice Halbwachs,
pointed out a half century ago that
scholars have
"collective
memory unfolds within a spatial framework,"
begun to analyze systematically how memory is infused into urban space,
Spanning a wide array of ob?
particularly in the form of monuments.6
stones and statues to plaques and street signs?monuments
jects?from
are paradoxical structures. Though erected for eternity with the intent of
in physical form, they suffer from built-in
fixing the past permanently
For while monuments
obsolescence.
ostensibly are erected to commemo?
rate some feature of the past, they actually offer a clearer image of the
present's view of it. And inasmuch as this view inevitably evolves over
is subject to reappraisal?as
time, the status of most existing monuments
manifested by their demolition,
alteration, or replacement.
By examining
the variety of responses toward monuments over time, therefore, the evolving
nature of memory reveals itself.7
5. Christian Schneider, "Historikerstreit auf bayerisch," SuddeutscheZeitung (SZ). 6/7
November 1993, p. 3.
6. Halbwachs further notes, "we can understand how we recapture the past only by
understanding how it is ... preserved in our physical surroundings."Maurice Halbwachs,
The CollectiveMemory(New York, 1980), 140. Since Pierre Nora's work on the subject,
other scholars have focused on the relationship between monuments, memory, and iden?
tity. See, among many others, Pierre Nora, "Between Memory and History: Les lieux de
The Poli?
memoire," Representations
(Spring, 1989): 7-25; John Gillis, ed., Commemorations:
tics of National Identity (Princeton, 1994); James Young, The Textureof Memory:Holocaust
Roots:CollectiveMemory
Memoriaband Meaning(New Haven, 1993); Yael Zerubavel, Recovered
and the Makingof IsraetiNationalTradition(Chicago, 1995); Thomas Nipperdey, "Nationalidee
und Nationaldenkmal in Deutschland im 19. Jahrhundert," HistorischeZeitschrift3 (1968):
529-85.
7. Halbwachs's assertion that memory is fundamentally rooted and preserved in social
relationships?indeed, that it is condemned to oblivion without them?raises questions as
to its dissemination over time. The apparent difficulty in accounting for the passing on of
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in postwar
The shifting memory of the revolutionary era of 1918-1919
Munich is best analyzed by studying the wide range of responses toward
it. The erection of new monuments as
the monuments commemorating
well as the demolition,
restoration, or relocation of old ones reveal nu?
merous insights into the dynamics of memory. With respect to these various
types of responses, an analytical strategy combining a formal and "biomanner of understand?
graphical" analysis offers the most comprehensive
ing the role of monuments in the formation of memory.8 This approach
as well as its
focuses upon the object and the manner of commemoration
The degree of selectivity displayed in choosing
origins and reception.
what is to be commemorated
and what is to be omitted constitutes the
first issue of consideration.

Understanding how the past is commemorated
the
monument's
formal qualities; whether it is abstract
requires studying
or figurative, whether or not it possesses a textual inscription, as well as
the wording of that inscription, its size and location (both affecting its
public visibility) bears heavily on a monument's ability to convey an in?
tended message. Moreover, the question of agency and intent?who
erected
a monument
and why?provides
into
the
monument's
insights
signifi?
cance. Finally, its popular reception?especially
the presence of debate or
controversy surrounding a monument's erection?yields
perhaps the clearest
insights into collective memory.
Before examining the various responses to monuments
pertaining to
in postwar Munich, however, it is neces?
the revolutions of 1918-1919
sary to discuss briefly the history of the period itself. Since the memories
of this important period have frequently diverged from the historical record,
discussing the era's central events provides some standard by which to
evaluate their evolution in memory. Since this undertaking is necessarily
dependent upon the interpretations of historians who are themselves embedded in their own and their era's particular concerns, reconstructing
the events of the past requires maintaining a critical eye toward underlyfor all of the recent insights
agendas.9 Nevertheless,

ing historiographical

memory once its original bearers, those who personally experienced events, have them?
selves passed on, however, is addressedby pointing to the existence of "communities of
memory," groups who empatheticallyidentify with, and assign meaning to, events of the
past through various commemorativeceremonies and gestures. Iwona Irwin-Zarecka,Frames
The Dynamicsof CollectiveMemory(New Brunswick, 1994), 47-49; Paul
of Remembrance:
Connerton, How Societies Remember (Cambridge, 1989), 37-40.
8. James Young refers to a "biographical"approachto monuments, Young, The Texture
of Memory,ix.
9. The Bavarian revolutions sparked the most historical studies during the 1960s and
1970s and have tailed off as of late. The subject acquired the most interest among East
German historians who, like Hans Beyer, aimed to demonstrate the existence of mass
Hans Beyer, Von derNovemberRevolution
working-classsupport for the second Rdterepublik,
zur Rdterepublik
in Miinchen(Berlin, 1957). An opposingview can be found in Allan MitchelTs,
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the two

ulti?

as distinct.10

emerge
Although historians have focused more on the course of revolutionary
era in Bavaria is arguevents in Berlin, the history of the revolutionary
Bavaria was
ably more intriguing. In many ways, early twentieth-century
an unlikely setting for political revolution.
Ruled by the longest uninterrupted monarchy in Europe, the Wittelsbachs, and dominated by the Catholic
Church, Bavaria was a seemingly stable political entity firmly in the hands
forces. However,
as Allan Mitchell has concisely put it,
of conservative
after World War I, "Bavaria was the first of the German states to become
a republic and the last to be released from the grip of radicalism."11 In?
1918 to the first
for almost exactly six months, from 7 November
of
Bavaria
instabil1919,
unprecedented
political
days
May
experienced
of
of
four
left?
the
fall
the
to
the
different
from
monarchy
appearance
ity,
brief
outbreak
of
civil
war
to
the
but
bloody
brought
wing governments,
deed,

of "white" counterrevolutionary
about by the intervention
military forces.
contributed
to
this
turn in Bavar?
factors
revolutionary
Many complex
ian history. The resistance of the monarchy to adopt overdue political
of economic
the exist?
conditions,
reforms, the war-induced
worsening
ence of a growing and disaffected working class, and the resulting in?
crease of support for the SPD, as well as the general war weariness all
helped to create an atmosphere of acute political discontent in Munich.12
Revolutionin Bavaria,1918-1919: The EisnerRegimeand the SovietRepublic(Princeton, 1965)
which, though clearly oriented toward debunking east bloc historiography,is the best work
in the fairly scant English-languageliterature on the subject. See also Richard Grunberger,
Red Rising in Bavaria(London, 1973). Recent attention toward Kurt Eisner's role in the
period has been particularlypromoted by the work of his granddaughter,the journalist Freya
Eisner, who has been motivated by the desire to overturnleft-wing and right-wing stereotypes
about Eisner's political career. See, most recently, Freya Eisner, "Kurt Eisners Ort in der
sozialistischen Bewegung," Vierteljahreshefte
fiir Zeitgeschichte
(July, 1995): 407-37. See also
Rudolf Herz and Dirk Halfbrodt, Revolutionund Fotografie,Munchen1918/19 (Berlin, 1988).
10. For other works on history and memory, see Patrick Hutton, History as an Art of
Memory(Hanover, NH, 1993); Richard Terdiman, PresentPast: Modernityand the Memory
Crisis (Ithaca, 1993; Jacques Le Goff, Historyand Memory(New York, 1992). See also the
journal, History and Memory:Studies in Representationof the Past. For the purposes of this
brief essay, the following simplified distinctions between history and memory can be of?
fered: history is the reconstruction of the past in written form by historians; memory
represents how the past (as well as how written history) is perceived by society. Whereas
the past is forever fixed, both history and memory evolve over time, with neither attaining
an absolute or objectively "true" understanding of the past. This is not to say that history
and memory are equally subjective, for their standardsof reconstructing the past are very
different. Still, although history has traditionally aimed (at least until recently) for a high
degree of scientific objectivity, the opposition made by Halbwachs and others between a
scientific history and "subjective" view of the past represented by memory can no longer
be accepted.
11. Mitchell, Revolutionin Bavaria,5.
12. Ibid., 11-20. The creationof new war-relatedindustriesin the city after 1914 (especially
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It was the pivotal role of Kurt Eisner, the head of the Munich USPD
(Independent Socialists), in guiding this discontent in a revolutionary di?
rection that proved decisive. Eisner, a resident of Munich since 1910, had
opposed the war from the beginning and had gradually won support for
his revolutionary aims. On 7 November 1918, the extent of local support
for Eisner became

clear at the enormous

organized
peace demonstration
after
by the socialist parties and trade unions at Munich's Theresienwiese;
delivering a speech criticizing the Bavarian government in front of some
50,000 people, Eisner led a sizable band of soldiers, workers, and other
radicals in a march through the city that culminated in the forced occu?
pation of the Bavarian Landtag.13 There, before a large crowd, Eisner
declared the monarchy deposed and proclaimed the creation of the "Freistaat
the new Bavarian republic.14 With King Ludwig III and his
family gone and billowing red flags draped from the city's main cathedral,
the Frauenkirche, the revolution appeared to have been a success.
The success of the revolution, however, was short-lived. Several months
after having acquired the position of prime minister, Eisner ran into po?
litical difficulties with his SPD coalition partners over their opposition to
the future participation in the governance of the state of the revolution?

Bayern,"

ary workers and soldiers' councils, or Rate. Forced to bow to the de?
mands of the moderate SPD, however,
Eisner lost the support of the
more radical anarchists and communists.
This fragmentation of the Left
contributed
1919 which,
right-wing
led Eisner

to the USPD's poor showing in the elections of 12 January
in addition to worsening economic problems and growing
agitation by extremist groups such as the Thule-Gesellschaft,
to decide to tender his resignation in the hope of restoring

political order.15
The restoration

of political

stability,

however,

was doomed

by the as-

the Krupp works in the northern districts) dramaticallyincreased the size of Munich's
working class, a development that lent new support to the SPD and its constitutional
reform efforts. Ibid., 20-29.
13. Ibid., 89-101; Schmolze, Revolutionund Raterepublik,
85-110.
14. The oft-cited line read by Eisner was: "Fortan ist Bayern ein Freistaat"(From this
moment on, Bavariais a republic). As will be seen, the use of the term Freistaatwould be
highly controversialin postwar Munich. Rathaus Munchen/Direktorium, Stenographischer
Sitzungsdienst(RMDSS)/RP, Bauausschuss,2 February1989, 27-34.
15. Compared to the SPD's 33 percent of the vote, the USPD received only 2.5 per?
cent. The fact that the BVP, the postwar incarnation of the Catholic Center Party, re?
ceived the highest electoral total of 35 percent indicates the general degree of conservatism
in Bavaria. Mitchell, Revolutionin Bavaria,217-18. The Thule-Gesellschaftwas the most
active in organizing propagandisticsmear campaigns against the Eisner regime as well as
more drastic actions ranging from espionage and kidnapping to paramilitaryinsurrection.
HermannWilhelm, Dichter,Denker,Fememorder:
Rechtsradikalismus
undAntisemitismus
in Miinchen
von derJahrhundertwende
bis 1921 (Berlin, 1989), 57-76.
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of Kurt Eisner on 20 February 1919 by a twenty-two
year old
Count Anton von Arco auf Valley, in front of the Palais

sassination

ex-lieutenant,

in Munich's Altstadt. This single act
Montgelas on the Promenadestrasse
of political violence, committed by a man of strong right-wing
and antiSemitic convictions,
transformed
the
Bavarian
radically
political scene.16
further
assassination
Bavarian
Following
attempts against
Landtag mem?
bers the same day, a new radical government,
or Zentralrat, dominated by
the left-wing parties and Rate, seized power under the leadership of Ernst
Niekisch and declared martial law.17 By early April, however, the inability
of the new

to restore order led to the occurrence
of two
government
revolutions. On April 7, a group of idealistic anarchists, including
Niekisch, Ernst Toller, Gustav Landauer, and Erich Muhsam, proclaimed
the creation of a Bavarian Soviet Republic
(Rdterepublik) in the hope of

additional

spreading
however,
Levien,

"world

revolution."

This government
lasted less than a week,
time the communists,
led by Eugen Levine and Max
what they dismissed as the "pseudo-Soviet
Republic,"

at which

replaced
(Scheinrdterepublik) with a second, genuine Soviet Republic.18
The violent suppression of the second Rdterepublik by "white" military
forces in early May 1919 brought to a bloody end the six-month period
of revolutionary
activity in Munich. As in Berlin, where the SPD-led

cooperated with the conservative military in crushing
in January 1919, the Munich SPD leader, Johannes
Gustav Noske,
Hoffmann, together with hardline SPD Reichswehrminister
ordered the retaking of the city by a coalition of government
troops and
the
commanded
Prussian
units,
right-wing Freikorps
by
general Ernst von
Oven. Having already engaged in atrocities on the outskirts of the city,

republican government
the Spartacist uprising

the invading 35,000 man army launched into a vengeful campaign of
murder upon hearing news of the retaliatory execution
of ten hostages
of
members
the
and
two Freikorps
Thule-Gesellschaft
eight
(including
of
"red"
at
the
south
the Altstadt.
soldiers) by
troops
Luitpoldgymnasium
In the following
"white"
killed
over 600
days,
troops indiscriminately
in
the
in
city, particularly
left-leaning, working-class neighborhoods
people
such as Giesing.19 Among the most prominent

victims were Gustav Landauer,

16. It has often been speculated that Arco-Valley killed Eisner for complex psychological
reasons due to his own anti-Semitic self-hatred. Born of a Jewish mother (from the Co?
logne Oppenheimer banking family), Arco-Valley had been rejected for membership in the
Thule-Gesellschaft because of his "impure" background?a fact that, according to many,
led him to assassinateEisner as proof of his racial trustworthiness.Wilhelm, Dichter,Denker,
62; Schmolze, Revoltionund Raterepublik,227-29.
Fememorder,
17. Albert Schwarz, "Die Zeit von 1918 bis 1933," in HandbuchderBayerischenGeschichte,
ed. Max Spindler, vol. 4 (Munich, 1974), 428.
18. Mitchell, Revolutionin Bavaria,303-19; Grunberger, Red Rising, 111-14.
19. The total death figures vary. Hans-Gunther Richardi has claimed that between 30
April and 8 May 1919, some 557 people were killed. "Die kurze Herrschaft der Rate in
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who was beaten to death and "Red Army" chief, Rudolf Egelhofer, who
was fatally shot. Following subsequent trials, Eugen Levine was executed
for treason while the other revolutionary leaders received jail sentences of
varying lengths.
Although the Bavarian Soviet

Republic's existence was brief, its longImmediately following the crushing of the
Left, Bavaria became a bastion of right-wing political radicalism. In March
1920, a Reichswehr-\ed putsch brought to power Gustav von Kahr, who
term effects were considerable.

haven for
subsequently turned Bavaria into a so-called Ordnungszelle?a
all the existing right-wing,
and antirepublican
militaristic, monarchistic,
forces in Germany.20 This reactionary atmosphere, more importandy, provided
fertile ground for the emergence of the Nazi Party, many of whose future
members had actively opposed the Eisner regime.21 Up until, and even
Hitler's failed putsch at the Feldherrnhalle on 9 November
following,
1923, the NSDAP

gained considerable political support in the city.22 And
for
the Nazis subsequently declined in Munich, the party's
although support
the city the loyalty of Hitler and the official title,
success
earned
early
"Capital of the Movement,"
"Hauptstadt der Bewegung," in 1935. In short,
Munich's chaotic experience of left-wing revolution promoted the ascendancy
of the radical Right and helped make the city the birthplace of the most
fateful political

movement

in modern

German history.23

Miinchen," SZ, 7 April 1994, p. 35. Others cite figures of over 700, if not 1000. Hans
Nohbauer, Miinchen:Eine Geschichteder Stadt und ihrerBurgervol. 2. Von 1854 bis zur
Gegenwart(Munich, 1992), 206; Schwarz, "Die Zeit," 432.
20. Wilfried Rudloff, "Auf dem Weg zum 'Hilter-Putsch': GegenrevolutionaresMilieu
und friiherNationalsozialismus
in Miinchen,"in StadtmuseumMiinchen, Miinchen?"Hauptstadt
der Bewegung"(Munich, 1993), 36.
21. Among the future Nazis who opposed the Eisner regime and attempted to unseat
the Rdterepublik
were former members of the Thule-Gesellschaft such as Dietrich Eckart,
Hans Frank, Rudolf Hess, and Alfred Rosenberg, and Freikorps members, such as Franz
Ritter von Epp and Ernst Rohm.
22. In national Reichstag elections, Munich support for the NSDAP began higher than
the national total but later sank below it. Thus, in May 1924, 28.5 percent of all Miinchner
voted for the Volkischer Block (the successor party to the temporarilybanned NSDAP),
while only 6.5 percent of all Germans voted for it nationally; in May, 1928, the Nazis
gained 2.6 percent of the total national vote, but 10.7 percent of the Munich vote; in
September the figures were 18.3 percent nationally and 21.8 percent in the city; by July
1932, however, the figures were 37.3 percent nationally and 28.9 percent locally, and by
November 1932, the figures were 33.1 percent and 24.9 percent respectively. See Clemens
Vollnhals, "Der Aufstieg der NSDAP in Miinchen, 1925 bis 1933: Fordererund Gegner,"
in: Miinchen?"Hauptstadtder Bewegung,"157-65; Richard Hamilton, Who Votedfor Hitler?
(Princeton, 1982), 144-55, 476; Klaus Schumann, "Kommunalpolitikin Miinchen zwischen
1918 und 1933," in ChristophStolzl, Die Zwanziger
Jahrein Miinchen(Munich, 1979), 1-17.
23. See the catalogue for the eponymous 1993-94 exhibition at the Munich city mu?
seum, Miinchen?"Hauptstadtder Bewegung,"(Munich, 1993) for the most comprehensive
view of the relationshipbetween the city and the movement. See also Bjorn Mensing and
FriedrichPrinz, Irrlichtim leuchtenden
Miinchen"?
Der Nationalsozialismus
in der "Hauptstadt
der

GAVRIEL

ROSENFELD

229

of 1918-1919,
in turn,
upheaval caused by the revolutions
effect of politicizing
their place in collective
unavoidable
of the Weimar Republic
to the present
From the beginning
memory.
of
Kurt
Eisner
and
the
Bavarian revo?
memories
postwar period, opposing
have competed fiercely with one another in Munich.
lutions of 1918-1919
During the Weimar period, both the Left and the Right commemorated
the turbulent revolutionary era in highly partisan fashion, with each claiming
The political
has had the

their respective martyrs. After 1933, however, the Nazis attempted forcof memories and impose an official
ibly to erase the prior competition
consensus.
This was the period in which distortions of the
mnemonic
historical record, extant since the Weimar era, were firmly canonized and
the myth of Kurt Eisner as the demonic architect of revolutionary violence
and civic chaos was enthroned as the standard view of the past. In con?
of memory in the Third Reich,
trast to this rather predictable development
the postwar era has witnessed the return of the politicized contestation of
Since 1945, the liberal and
memory as well as its dynamic expansion.
formed
conservative views of Kurt Eisner and the revolutions of 1918-1919
era have once more competed against one another. A new
of these views of the past is their refraction through the recent
experience of the Third Reich. To a degree, the distorted Nazi myths of
of 1918-1919
were retained by the postwar
Eisner and the revolutions
in the Weimar
feature

citizens.
Miinchner,
among conservative
Left-wing
society,
especially
era to the Third Reich in
meanwhile,
frequently linked the revolutionary
to impart lessons about
a didactic manner, using the events of 1918-1919
of these oppos?
the dangers of fascism. Despite the incessant competition
the years since 1945 generally have witnessed the
ing views, however,
to the more liberal one. In the
of
the
conservative
perspective
yielding
historical
a
view
dominated
by
myths has yielded considerably to
process,
one which more closely resembles the historical record. This, of course,
is not to deny the partisan nature and selective vision of both perspec?
is it to equate their subjectivity.
Whereas the
tives; neither, however,
the place of
view generally has attempted to deemphasize
conservative
in local memory, the lib?
Kurt Eisner and the revolutions of 1918-1919
eral view has attempted to increase it. The influence of this latter position,
in turn, is confirmed by the increasingly explicit pattern of commemorating
the revolutionary past in local monuments. Nevertheless, despite this apparent
exist"progress" in coming to terms with a difficult past, the continuing
reveals
that
the
its
ence of dissension
proverbial
legacy
surrounding
"
Schlufistrich" has by no means been drawn.
left-wing supporters of Kurt Eisner and
During the Weimar Republic,
took the most active role in commemorating
the Bavarian revolutions
act occurred on the very
their legacy in the city. The first commemorative
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day of Eisner's assassination, 21 February 1919, in the form of a spontaneous memorial erected in front of the murder site at the Palais Montgelas
on the Promenadestrasse. Immediately after Eisner's death, unknown per?
sons scattered
chair behind

sawdust

over the remaining pool of blood and placed a
with a picture of Eisner and a black ribbon of
passersby, most notably soldiers, stacked assorted rifles

it adorned

mourning. Other
in the form of a pyramid at the site, which still others decorated with
flowers and wreaths. Capped with a sign that read "Proletarians, remove
was
your hat before the blood of Eisner," the provisional monument
by thousands of Miinchner and attested to Eisner's new and unlikely status as a "Bavarian folk hero."24 Indeed, the attendance of over
100,000 people in the funeral procession on 26 February 1919 provided
further proof of his local standing. This monument, however, would only
be a provisional one that lasted until the chaotic month of April 1919.25
Following the burial of Eisner's ashes in Munich's Ostfriedhof, his left?
visited

measures. On
wing supporters adopted more permanent commemorative
the second anniversary of the Bavarian revolution on 7 November
1920,
the local SPD leadership, together with labor union leaders, unveiled a
bronze plaque bearing a relief of Eisner and the words, "To Kurt Eisner,
the fallen fighter for freedom and truth, from his comrades," in the court
of both groups' central headquarters on the Pestalozzistrasse.26 Two years
a more
later, on 1 May 1922, the same left-wing coalition commemorated
somber occasion, the third anniversary of the crushing of the Bavarian
Soviet Republic, by unveiling a large cubic monument dedicated to Eisner,
as well as to the victims of the revolution of 1919, at the Ostfriedhof.
The selection of this particular site was not incidental; as the Ostfriedhof
was the cemetery nearest to Munich's solidly working-class and left-leaning
neighborhood of Giesing, it provided the most politically appropriate location
to acknowledge
the sacrifices made by the population
on behalf of
the revolution.

The monument clearly articulated the Left's memory of
the revolutionary
an urn bearing Eisner's ashes, the
past. Containing
"Revolutionsdenkmal"
was graced with a bronze plaque commemorating
texts on its front and rear sides.
Eisner, as well as two accompanying
While the front exhibited the words, "To the dead of the revolution of
Bewegung"(Regensburg, 1991); Anthony Nicholls, "Hitler and the BavarianBackgroundto
National Socialism," in: GermanDemocracy
and the Triumphof Hitler, ed. Anthony Nicholls
and Erich Matthias (London, 1971), 99-128.
24. Schmolze, Revoltionund Raterepublik,
240-42; Freya Eisner, "Zwischen Kapitalismus
und Kommunismus," Die Zeit, 18 February 1994, p. 74; Allan Mitchell refers to this
memorial as a "pagan altar," 275; Grunberger,Red Rising, 80; Herz and Halfbrodt, Revo?
lution und Fotografie,119?24.
25. Herz, Revolutionund Fotografie,120.
26. Ibid., 301.
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1919," the rear displayed a quotation by Ernst Toller: "He who prepares
the paths, dies on the threshold, but death bows before him in honor."27
Finally, sometime later in the decade, the Bavarian state erected a third
plaque in memory of Eisner at the site of his murder on the outer wall of
the Palais Montgelas.28 All of these monuments
clearly demonstrated
existence of local respect for the slain prime minister.

the

The Right, however, represented the revolutionary era in a much different
Instead of commemorating
Eisner, it concentrated on commemo?
revolution.
In September
its
own
dead
claimed
the
1919, a
by
rating
manner.

hostages killed by "red" troops at
on the exterior wall against which
they were shot. Sponsored most probably by the right-wing Deutschvolkische
the text read: "Ernst
Trutzbund and the Thule-Gesellschaft,
Schutz-und
Anton
Walter
Walter
Wilhelm
Deike,
Neuhaus,
Daumenlang,
Berger,
Freiherr
Karl
Prinz
Gust.
Thurn
und
Teuchert,
Taxis, Grafin
Seydlitz,
plaque to the eight Thule-Gesellschaft
the Luitpoldgymnasium
was erected

Hella Westarp died at the hands of the dastardly on April 30, 1919." Ten
years later, an amended version of this plaque was erected including the
names of the two Freikorps soldiers who, like the other eight hostages,
These right-wing
were killed at the Luitpoldgymnasium.29
monuments,
together with their left-wing
counterparts, indicate
was a divisive one that witnessed the competition

that the Weimar
of memories

era

of the

recent

revolutionary
past.
The rise of the Nazis to power in 1933 led to the drastic reformulation
of Munich's
Given their ex?
revolutionary
past in collective
memory.
the Nazis quickly
treme hatred of Eisner and the revolutions of 1918?1919,

efforts to purge the physical reminders of the past from the
22
On
city.30
June 1933, Nazi city councilmen Hans Zoberlein and Christian
as an "eyesore" for
Weber attacked the Ostfriedhof Revolutionsdenkmal
undertook

27. Thomas Guttmann, ed., Giesing: Vom Dorf zum Stadtteil (Munich, 1990), 176-79,
259. See Herz and Halfbrodt, Revolutionund Fotografle,11, for a photograph of the monu?
ment. The bronze plaque read: "Kurt Eisner, born 14 May 1867. Died 21 February 1919."
Herz and Halfbrodt, Revolutionund Fotografle,301.
28. Little evidence exists of the actual plaque. The Munich Stadtarchiv possesses no
records of it; the few references to it appear after 1945 with the attempts of certain city
councilmembers to restore it. Stadtarchiv Miinchen/Ratsitzungsprotokolle (StAMu/RP),
Stadtrat, 14 January 1947, 190-91; 21 January 1947, 289-98. Letter to author from Dr.
Helmuth Stahleder, StadtarchivMiinchen, 2 January 1996.
29. Letter to author from Dr. Helmuth Stahleder, StadtarchivMiinchen, 2 January 1996.
I am indebted to Dr. Stahleder for his assistance in tracking down the origins of this
plaque. The date of this monument is the most likely one, but it may have been erected
in 1933. For the slightly amended text see August Alckens, Miinchenin Erz und Stein:
Gedenktafeln,Denkmaler,Gedenkbmnnen(Mainburg, 1973), 46.
30. In Mein Kampf, Hitler refers to Eisner as having acted "solely as a servant of the
Jews" who were trying to make the Reich "fall. . . prey to Bolshevism." Adolf Hitler,
Mein Kampf(New York, 1971), 557.
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"all good Germans" and called for its removal from the cemetery "as a
self-evident matter of honor." Like the Nazis' destruction of Walter Gropius's
to the victims of the Kapp Putsch in Weimar
expressionist monument
monument
to Rosa Luxemburg and
of the Rev1933, the demolition
olutionsdenkmal
on 22 June 1933 constituted an act of deliberate political
intimidation.
Zoberlein was a representative of the working-class
neigh-

and Ludwig Mies van der Rohe's
in Berlin after
Karl Liebknecht

borhood

of Giesing and undoubtedly
intended the demolition
of the
as a clear message to its left-leaning inhabitants. The Nazis'
destruction
of plaques to Eisner on the Promenadestrasse
and the
Pestalozzistrasse also drove this point home.31 A second factor underpinning
monument

the destruction

of the Revolutionsdenkmal

was anti-Semitism.

At the same

time that Eisner's ashes were removed from the Ostfriedhof, the city council
decided to remove the ashes of Gustav Landauer from the Waldfriedhof,
or Forest Cemetery. Zoberlein justified this measure by arguing that, "the
Christian citizenry does not want the ashes of their relatives to be interred with those of the Jews Eisner and Landauer." The expulsion of the
two Jewish revolutionaries demonstrated, according to Zoberlein, that "we
as Christians, Bavarians, and Germans do not want to be in a community
with Jews."32 With these measures,
Left found clear expression.

Nazi hatred of the Jews and of the

The Nazis' efforts to extinguish the memory of the revolutions of19181919 completely, however, were not wholly successful. The demolition of
the Ostfriedhof monument
paradoxically led not so much to the total
elimination of memory but to its diminution through spatial transferral.
Eisner's remains were ordered reinterred in the new Jewish cemetery in
Schwabing together with those of Gustav Landauer, their graves marked
with a new simple stone bearing their names.33 The memory of the
revolutionary era, marginalized in the peripherally-located,
textually-mute
in this
stone, was essentially banished from public view. Nevertheless,
new monument
"created" by the Nazis, it maintained a precarious if
private existence.
The Nazis, however, did not content themselves with eliminating the
but erected
already existing monuments to the revolutions of 1918-1919
their own revisionist versions of the past as well. The first move taken by
the local Nazi leadership occurred in April 1933 with the renaming of
31. Guttmann, Giesing,176-79. As one Nazi councilman argued, "the memory of Kurt
Eisner will remain preserved by the people . . . as a deterrent example for those who are
inclined to harm the state." Herz and Halfbrodt, Revolutionund Fotografie,301.
32. Herz and Halfbrodt, Revolutionund Fotografie,301.
undjudischeFriedhofe
in Miinchen,
33. KarlW. Schubsky,"JiidischeFriedhofe,"in Synagogen
ed. Wolfram Selig (Munich, 1988), 186.
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the Promenadeplatz
into the Ritter-von-Epp-Platz
(after the Freikorps
leader, Franz Ritter von Epp who was instrumental in leading the suppression
of the second Rdterepublik) ,34 The choice of this site was no doubt deliberate; since it fronted the site of Eisner's assassination on the Promenadestrasse,
the new name clearly asserted the Right's occupation
and reconstitution
of a historic site of the Left. Several years later, the local Nazi leadership
hostages executed by the red
appropriated the memory of the right-wing
in April 1919. In October 1936, a plaque
troops at the Luitpoldgymnasium
to the two Freikorps soldiers killed was erected at the site that read:
soldiers Linnebriigger,
"Here, on April 30, 1919, the government
Fritz,
father of five children, 41 years old, and Hindorf, Walter, 19 years old,
fell as defenseless prisoners at the hands of murderers."35 That same year,
the Nazi-led
city council attempted to create further sympathy for the
"martyrs" of the revolution by naming four streets in the neighborhood
after Thule-Gesellschaft
of Kirchtrudering
members, Hella von Westarp,
and Walther Deike, as well as the
Franz Carl Freiherr von Teuchert,
Freikorps soldier, Fritz Linnebriigger.36
The most dramatic expression of the Nazis' version
revolutions appeared in the form of the "Freikorpsdenkmal"

of the Bavarian
in the neighbor?
Liebermann
and

of Giesing. Designed
by the sculptor Ferdinand
at a busy traffic site, the Giesinger Berg, on 3 May 1942, the
of a twenty-four
foot high
monumental
stone structure was composed
relief of a naked male figure strangling a snake symbolizing
"degeneration
and decline"; flanking the figure on an adjoining wall were the emblems
and names of the 22 Freikorps companies that participated in the sup?
hood

erected

pression of the Rdterepublik in early May of 1919.37 Although the symbolwas fairly obvious?the
heroic Right saving the
ism of the monument
function was more significant.
Volk from the dire threat of the Left?its
comIn the planning stages since 1937, the late date of the monument's
pletion testifies to the symbolic importance the Nazis assigned to it. The
fact that it was finished at all is remarkable since the Second World War
had halted many other construction
projects sponsored by the regime.
of the Revolutionsdenkmal
at the
likely, as with the demolition
to remind the
the Nazis intended the Freikorps monument
Ostfriedhof,
working-class inhabitants of Giesing of the Right's dominance over the Left
Most

not only in the past but in the present

as well.

34. Kurt Preis, MiinchenuntermHakenkreuz, 1933-1945 (Munich, 1989), 30-31.
35. Alckens, Miinchenin Erz und Stein, 46.
Zu Fuss durchdie Geschichteunserer
36. See Hans Dollinger, Die MiinchnerStrassennamen:
Stadt (Munich, 1995), 121, 56, 179, 293.
37. Elisabeth Angermairand Ulrike Haerendel, eds., Inszenierter
Alltag: "Volksgemeinschaft"
im nationalsozialistischen
Miinchen,1933-1945 (Munich, 1993), 32; Guttmann, Giesing, 17679; Alckens, Miinchenin Erz und Stein, 41.
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After 1945, the experience of the Third Reich strongly affected the post?
war memory of Kurt Eisner and the revolutions of 1918-1919.
Although
the revolutionary
era had been traumatic in its own right, the far more
dramatic events that followed it?in
particular, the establishment of the
Third Reich, the outbreak of the Second World War, and the extensive
war damage suffered by the city of Munich?inevitably
east it in their
shadow. As a result, the memory of the revolutionary
era was increasingly refracted through the local memory of the Third Reich and the
evolution of the memory of the events of 1918-1919
was both halted
and propelled by attendant shifts in the memory of the Nazi era. As the
latter was confronted more openly over time, so was the former. The
era in Munich has thus
memory of Kurt Eisner and the revolutionary
been

marked by an increasing willingness to abandon more prejudiced
and subjective views of the past for a more balanced and nuanced per?
spective. This development found clear expression in the increasingly explicit
Kurt Eisner and the revolutions of 1918-1919
pattern of commemorating
in Munich. Beginning with the negative measure of demolishing unwanted
in the late 1940s, the commemoration
Nazi monuments
process shifted
in the 1950s to more tentative positive acts, such as restoring destroy ed
and finally to the more direct attempts after the late 1960s
monuments,
to erect new monuments

of increasingly forthright form, text, and loca?
tion. And yet, despite this progressive process of normalization, the memory
of the Bavarian revolutions of 1918-1919
has to this day remained highly
politicized.
The first years after 1945 displayed the most reluctance to confront the
memory of Munich's revolutionary
past. During this period, it was far
easier to overturn the Nazis' highly partisan view of the revolutions of
1918-1919
than to forge a consensus for remembering it. The initial and
easiest measures were thus part of the general program of urban denazifidecreed by the Allied occupation forces and undertaken by city
in
agencies.38 The first relevant move was to grant the Promenadeplatz
the Altstadt its original name by eliminating its Nazi-era appellation, the
cation

Ritter-von-Epp-Platz.39
Interestingly, this was not repeated with the four
Nazi-era streetnames to the victims of the "red" troops in 1919 which
remained unaltered. This pragmatic strategy of selective decommemoration,
also surfaced briefly with the postwar treatment
of the
moreover,
38. Under the terms of Allied Control Council Directive no. 30, "any monument. . .
which tends to preserve. . . the German military tradition... or to commemorate the
Nazi party. . . must be completely destroyed. . ." "Directive no. 30," OfficialGazetteof the
ControlCouncilfor Germany,no. 7 (31 May 1946): 154.
39. See "Umbenennung von Strassenund Platzen," MiinchnerStadtanzeiger,26 Septem?
ber 1945, p. 3 and 3 October 1945, p. 3; Helmuth Stahleder, Haus-undStrassennamen
der
MiinchnerAltstadt(Munich, 1992), 24-25.

GAVRIEL

ROSENFELD

235

in Giesing. Although the emblems and Freikorps names
Freikorpsdenkmal
were removed as symbols of militarism prior to 1 January 1947 in accordance with Allied denazification
relief of
regulations, the monumental
the martial male figure itself remained standing. To be sure, little sentimental feeling existed within the local population toward the figure, which
already during the Third Reich had been derisively referred to as "der
nackerte Lackel" or "the naked oaf" (Figure 1). For a time, however, city
officials seemed to consider preserving the figure for "artistic reasons."
in December
Nevertheless,
1946,
citizens and the energetic lobbying

the surfacing of complaints
by local
of the Communist
city council faction

(KPD) to demolish the entire structure ultimately proved decisive. Shortly
thereafter, the remaining figure was torn down and the accompanying
wall reduced in height to the level of the surrounding retaining walls.40
Although overturning the Nazi view of the past through such demoli?
tion projects was relatively easy, restoring the mnemonic status quo ante?
more difficult.
the Left's view of the past from the Weimar period?was
On 14 January 1947, the KPD city council faction demanded the resto?
ration of the plaque to Eisner (removed by the Nazis after 1933) at the
site of his murder on the Palais Montgelas. After a heated discussion, the
city council referred the demand to the Bavarian state for consideration,
While issues of bureaucratic
point it was dropped altogether.
in
this
one of its most important
were
involved
decision,
jurisdiction
causes was the belief of numerous conservative members of the city council
at which

the memory of the Eisner era."
to avoid the memory of the past
Significantly,
of it. Mayor Karl Scharnagl, a
was itself founded on faulty memories
Union (CSU), for one, argued that since
member of the Christlich-Soziale
"Eisner was not the democrat that everyone
thought he was," it was
that "it was not advisable

to preserve
of
conservatives
the desire

this truly regrettable affair for all eternity."
unadvisable to "immortalize
that
this view was the assertion that "the acts of violence
Underlying
occurred [during the Eisner era] . . . were of such proportions . . . that we
do not believe they are worth remembering."41
Scharnagl's identification
violence that followed after his
of Eisner's regime with the revolutionary
assassination represented one of the most common distortions of the historical
record in postwar memory. This conflation of historical events, moreover,
40. City building director Hermann Leitenstorfer gave his approval for the demolition
after concluding that "artistic reasons for preserving [the figure] have receded in impor?
tance." StAMii/RP, Hauptausschuss, 13 February 1947, 174-76; "Gegen das FreikorpsDenkmal," MiinchnerMittag, 20 December 1946, p. 5. In its place, a bronze sculpture by
Josef Erber representing children at play, flanked by reliefs of scenes from local history,
was erected in the fall of 1959. "Ein Kinderbaum. . .," SZ, 27 October 1959, p. 4; Alckens,
Miinchenin Erz und Stein, 73.
41. StAMii/RP, Stadtrat, 21 January 1947, 291.
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would

surface repeatedly as the basis for resisting subsequent attempts to
Eisner or the revolutionary
era. In short, as indicated by
the city council's reluctance to pursue energetically the restoration of the
plaque to Eisner in 1947, negative memories of the slain prime minister
commemorate

contributed to the failure to restore his place in local memory.42
The 1947 city council debate further revealed that the political Left in
Munich held a very different memory of Eisner and the Bavarian revolu?
tionary era. During the debate, SPD and KPD city council members predictably defended Eisner's democratic credentials, asserted his innocence
for the violence that occurred after his murder, and demanded the resto?
ration of the plaque as an act of "reparations" for the deeds of the Nazis.
In so doing, they adhered more closely than conservatives to the histori?
cal record.

Not only did they carefully distinguish between the frequently
facts of the period, they perceptively
noted how "the consider?
able distance from the former era . . . had produced alterations in per?

blurred

The Left, however, was no less partisan
spective" among the opposition.
in its exploitation
of the past for their own ends. In defending Eisner's
the recent his?
city council factions mobilized
reputation, the left-wing
tory of the Third Reich on their behalf. SPD city councilman and union
leader Gustav Schiefer, for example, attempted to bolster Eisner's democratic
credentials by comparing him to the brave men of the famed Freiheitsaktion
Bayern, or Freedom Action Bavaria (a group which had attempted unsuccessfully to topple the local Nazi regime in late April 1945); for Schiefer,
of "a healthy opposition
that
Eisner had simply acted as a representative
was committed to establishing new conditions."43 Although more rhetori?
of 1918-1919
cal than substantive, the linkage of the revolutions
with
the resistance to the Third Reich

aimed to give moral legitimacy to persons
and events of the revolutionary past by asserting similarities between them
and the few heroic resistance figures of the more recent Nazi past. More
problematic than the SPD's drawing of analogies between the revolution?
was its partial hypocrisy in de?
ary era and the Third Reich, however,
fending Eisner. Indeed, after 1918, the SPD leadership had vigorously
opposed Eisner, the head of the rival USPD, during his short administra?
tion and had eagerly hoped to govern in his place. The party's postwar
loyalty to Eisner's legacy thus betrayed a selective memory as well, but in
the early postwar era, this left-wing memory of the past was too weak to
of Eisner and
resistance to the recommemoration
overcome
conservative
his revolutionary
legacy.
Following the general reluctance to confront the past in the 1940s, the
42. The fact that the bill was sponsored by the KPD?a party soon to be banned nationwide as a result of cold war tensions?no doubt also hampered its passage.
43. StAMu/RP, Stadtrat, 21 January 1947, 294.
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Eisner and
late 1950s witnessed the first limited moves to commemorate
In 1958, the Munich city council ordered the
the events of 1918-1919.
partial reconstruction of the demolished Ostfriedhof Revolutionsdenkmal.
The motivations behind this action are unclear; the fact, however, that
the measure was tacked onto an extant bill to erect a monument in the
Ostfriedhof to the political victims of the Nazi regime indicates that it
may have originated as an afterthought, though a comparatively progres?
sive one. That the effort to commemorate
the victims of the Third Reich
further dem?
of the victims of 1918-1919
prompted the commemoration
onstrates the postwar linkage between the two periods in local memory.
The close proximity of the early postwar era to the events of the Third
no doubt led many to derive meaning from the earlier revolution?
era
ary
only insofar as it evoked similarities with the Nazi era that fol-

Reich

This linkage, in turn, may have determined the inexact manner in
the Revolutionsdenkmal
was restored. Since neither remnants nor
drafts
of
the
were
to be found, the monument's form had
design
original
to be reconstructed according to the memory of the local sculptor, Konstantin
Frick. More significantly, the city council decreed that the original texts
were not to be reproduced in full; the only words that graced the recon?
lowed.
which

structed
1919."

monument,
therefore, were: "To the dead of the revolution of
The reference to Eisner was omitted as was Ernst Toller's quota-

tion. With such vague wording, the effect of the monument in preserving
was minimal; since the identity
the memory of the events of 1918-1919
of "the dead" was left undetermined,
one could have just as easily interpreted them to be Freikorps soldiers as left-wing sympathizers of the revo?
lution for whom the monument was originally intended. It is difficult to
know whether such ambiguity was intended. The Revolutionsdenkmal's
resemblance to many textually vague monuments
erected in the Federal
Republic to the victims of Nazism in the 1950s, however, seems to indicate an underlying desire to avoid a direct confrontation
with the past.
As with these postwar monuments, the refusal of the Revolutionsdenkmal
to identify "the dead" reflected the era's tendency to unite victim and
perpetrator together in a gesture of forced reconciliation.44 As such, the
seems
impact of the Third Reich upon postwar habits of commemoration
to have influenced the memory of the revolutions of 1918-1919.
In the 1960s, however, a dramatic shift occurred in the commemora?
tion of Eisner and the Bavarian revolutionary past. In the preceding dec?
ade, local city officials had attempted little more than the adaptive restoration
44. StAMii/RP, StR, Aktensammlung,22 April 1958, 1326. In light of this bill, assertions that the monument was restored in 1945 appear to be in error. See Guttmann,
Giesing, 176-79, 259 and "Die Inschrift und das Vermachtnis aufpoliert," SZ, 23 May
1989, p. 15.
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witnessed
to Eisner. The 1960s, however,
monuments
the postwar era's first attempts to fashion its own strategies of commemo?
rating the past. The marking of the 50th anniversary of the events of
measures. The most
in 1969 stimulated new commemorative
1918-1919
on
occurred
but
least
successful,
ambitious,
February 21, the anniversary
of Eisner's assassination, with the erection of a plaque on the site of his
of older Weimar

murder at the Palais Montgelas bearing the text: "Kurt Eisner was murdered
on this spot fifty years ago." Since the plaque's sponsors, a left-leaning
citizens' group (led by union leader and councilman
Ludwig Koch as
well as Eisner's granddaughter,
Freya Eisner) did not get permission for a
at the site, the provisional
plaque was removed
permanent monument
shortly after its erection.45 The most controversial measure of 1969, how?
ever, erupted one month earlier in January with the debate over naming
of Neuperlach.
in the outlying neighborhood
Originating as an SPD bill in the city council to mark the occasion of the
50th anniversary of Eisner's death, the proposal to create a Kurt-Eisner-Strasse
was linked to the suggestion to name one after Karl Marx. Significantly,
it was not the latter proposal but the former that became the focus of
a street after Kurt Eisner

controversy.
As demonstrated

CSU's objection to the bill, the
by the conservative
era remained burdened by nu?
of
Eisner
and
the
revolutionary
memory
merous conflations and omissions. Overall, the representatives of the CSU
deserved to remain
argued that the memory of the revolutions of 1918-1919
suppressed. This position, not surprisingly, was based upon the familiar, if
faulty, view of the past that blamed Eisner for the violent end of the
Haas argued, Eisner had been
era. As CSU councilwoman
revolutionary
ac?
a "communist"
who was guilty of "creatfing] . . . a Soviet Republic
summed up
his
belief that "what Eisner and
following wanted
. . [intervention]
and the
led, in the end, to the Reich government's.
result of 700 dead."47 Operating according to this view, CSU council
cording to the Russian
the general conservative

model."46

This erroneous

statement

to the proposal by
predictably tried to justify their opposition
making the populist claim that the name of Eisner "was associated in the
to CSU
minds of the local citizenry with great disaster." According
councilman Hans Stutzle, this was a period that "had not yet been worked
through" and had left "wounds that have not yet healed." "Naming a

members

45. Photo with caption, SZ, 22/23 February 1969, p. 15. As indicated by a local citizen's demand (in a letter to the editor in the SuddeutscheZeitung at this same time) to
restore of the original plaque at the site (demolished by the Nazis), the Weimar-era monu?
ment had clearly persisted in local memory. "Eisners Andenken ehren," SZ, 21 February
1969, p. 12.
46. StAMti/RP, Hauptausschuss, 14 January 1969, 6-21.
47. StAMii/RP, Stadtrat, 15 January 1969, 66-95.
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street after Eisner," he asserted, "would rip them open anew." As a concrete, if bizarre, example of the problems entailed with confronting the
past, Stiitzle cited the case of the widow of Eisner's assassin, Graf ArcoValley, who as one of "the still living victims of that era," should be
and respect" by waiting to enact such a measure
shown "consideration
"until one has greater distance in time from the former events." Con?
Ludwig Schmid, in turn, drew the full policy impli?
of this assertion by concluding
that, in light of the proposal's
controversial nature, it would be better to abandon the practice of naming streets after individuals altogether and, instead, name them after "wonservative councilman
cations

derful flowers, charming animals, or beautiful lakes."48 Politically motivated
impulse.
objections thus found expression in a depoliticizing
The responses of the SPD city council faction, in turn, displayed a
more nuanced, if no less engaged, view of the past. Marshaling historical
asserted Eisner's innocence of
facts on their behalf, SPD councilmembers
the
of
the violent suppression
revolutionary era and cited numerous details in support of their position that "the things that occurred after Eisner's
death were an effect of his murder."49 More interesting than the SPD
was its members' insights
citation of historical fact, however,
the
to SPD representatives,
the dynamics of memory. According
calumnies expressed toward Eisner were a product of a long period of
revisionist "historical falsification." As councilman Ludwig Koch argued,
although "the fact remains that during Eisner's regime, no acts of vio?
faction's
into

lence occurred,. . . . [n]either those who came after Eisner nor the dictators of the Third Reich attempted to display an objective depiction of
Eisner's historical image." The result of the ensuing "falsification," councilman
Fried added, was that "one is inclined today to adhere to this false view
of history." Interestingly, SPD leaders partially agreed with members of
that the dispute over Kurt Eisner had resulted from the continuing proximity to the historic events themselves. As Hans Preissinger
noted, the persistence of "emotions and memories, of a personal and sub?
jective nature" had strong political implications for historical understanding:
the CSU

The closer contemporary
history approaches politics, the more it is
falsified by the passions of politics. We have enough distance from
soMarx who, active a hundred years ago, . . . is viewed objectively,
In
of
his
time.
con?
as
a
historic
innovator
and
without
emotion
berly
trast, Eisner [is] still touched by contemporary history and falsified by
his?
fully-developed
political passions [and thus] lacks a well-rounded,
torical image.
48. StAMu/RP, Hauptausschuss,14 January 1969, 6-21.
49. Ibid.
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For Preissinger, however,
it was the CSU that was especially guilty of
view of the past for political gain.
a
"restorationist"
faulty,
promoting
the
CSU's
claimed
the existence of widespread
representatives
Although
to the measure among the local citizenry, it betrayed its par?
opposition
tisan agenda, according to Preissinger, by defending the feelings of Arcoact that implicitly "sanctioned the murder of Eisner."50
Valley's widow?an
The SPD, in turn, refused to allow the CSU to claim a popular mandate
for its opposition
to the bill. "You cannot speak of 'the population,'"
councilman Ludwig Koch accused the CSU, "because the segment of the
that strongly concerns me sees the history completely
differpopulation
His
still
Koch
the
white
stressed,
"rememberfed]
ently."
constituency,
troops and their murders," and thus understandably yearned "for a correction of the falsification of history."51 In short, by the late 1960s, the
of 1918-1919
still remained fragcollective
memory of the revolutions
versions.
mented into opposing politicized
The narrow approval of the SPD proposal to create a Kurt-EisnerStrasse in February 1969, in turn, sparked a brief, if intense, flurry of
controversy within the local population of Munich. As demonstrated by
letters to the editor received by the Miinchner Merkur, which closely covered the issue, much of the local citizenry disapproved of the measure.
According to the newspaper, some ninety percent of the more than 100
letters received within a week of the decision opposed naming a street
after Eisner.52 Many of the comments confirmed the SPD's view of the
existence of false stereotypes about Eisner and his legacy. Some referred
and a "political muddle-head,"
who had
to Eisner as a "Communist"
paved the way for the Soviet Republic; as one citizen noted, "To dedicate a street after a man whose deeds for Bavaria were of such a catastrophic nature amounts to completing the anti-Bavarian nonsense of Eisner
fifty years after the fact!" Another respondent articulated just how catastrophic Eisner had been for Bavaria by implying that his reckless overthrow of the monarchy had eliminated the city's resistance to political
extremism and eased "the victory of National Socialism." Although it is
this view was among conservatives,
other atunclear how widespread
tempts to link Eisner to the rise of the Nazis were made by respondents
who compared the city council's decision to name a street after him to
Street."
the hypothetical creation of "an Adolf-Hitler or Heinrich-Himmler
the
comments
scattered
Furthermore,
responses,
peppered
right-leaning
such as the demand by one citizen finally to honor the "Free Corps fighters

50. Ibid.
51. StAMii/RP, Stadtrat, 15 January 1969, 66-95.
52. "Leser schreiben uns," MM, 23 January 1969, p. 16.
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who gave their blood so that Munich could remain a free city."33 Finally,
the submission of a bill in the Bavarian Landtag by the far right-wing
NPD party in early February objecting to naming a street "after the com?
munist putschist, Kurt Kosmanowsky,
called Kurt Eisner,"
influence of classic anti-Semitic
myths of Nazi propaganda

betrayed the
and revealed

the latent political direction of a portion of local opposition to the measure.54
The conflict over the Kurt-Eisner-Strasse in 1969, in short, demonstrated
the existence of politically-determined
differences in collective memory.
Representatives of the CSU as well as members of its constituency exhibited
selective and distorted views of the revolutions of 1918-1919
and chose
to project the causes of the subsequent violent conclusion of the period
back onto its relatively peaceful beginnings under Eisner. Choosing not
to acknowledge
or condemn Eisner's murder as the cause of later events,
conservative
citizens and politicians viewed him as a perpetrator. The
in contrast, offered a far more objective picture of the past,
and
emphasizing the distinctions between Eisner's goals, his government,
the revolutionary
events which followed his death. Yet, the SPD view
was also underpinned by a convenient forgetting of their own position in
1918-1919.
In view of the enmity and irreconcilable differences between
the SPD and Eisner's USPD in 1918-1919,
the former's postwar claims
to protect his memory were, to say the least, ironic if not disingenuous.
SPD view,

Still, while the SPD position was somewhat selective in nature, it served
as a healthy corrective to the more problematic prejudicial alternative.
the city of Mu?
And yet, despite the creation of Kurt-Eisner-Strasse,
nich still lacked a central monument to Eisner's memory fifty years after
location of the street in the outlying
out-of-the-way
of
neighborhood
Neuperlach hardly served to preserve Eisner's memory
in a public manner. For this reason, further commemorative
impulses
appeared in the 1970s. In mid-1973, the SPD-led city neighborhood com?
his death.

The

mittee for the Altstadt submitted a bill in the city council for the erection
of a plaque for Eisner at the site of his murder. Planned for the eastern
wall of the Palais Montgelas on the Kardinal-Faulhaber-Strasse
(the old
the plaque was to read: "Palais Montgelas. The Bavar?
Promenadestrasse),
ian Prime Minister, Kurt Eisner, was murdered in front of this building on
February 21, 1919 (emphasis added)." Had it been approved, this plaque
would have promoted a new degree of public awareness about the past.
53. "StarkesEcho zum Thema Strassennamen,"MM, 18/19 January1969, p. 10; "Leser
schreiben uns,"MM, 23 January 1969, p. 16.
54. BayerischerLandtag,6. Legislaturperiode,1966-1970, supplement 1794, Schriftliche
Anfrage, NPD, 3 February 1969. Reminiscent of other anti-Semitic canardsproclaiming
the Jewish "identity" of leftist politicians, the charge that Eisner's name was Kosmanowsky
lacks all factual basis. Freya Eisner, "Zwischen Kapitalismusund Kommunismus,"Die Zeit,
18 February 1994, p. 74.
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Yet, a serious blow to this commemorative
gesture occurred when the
owner of the property rejected its erection on the site due to fears of
vandalism.55 As a result, when finally dedicated in late 1976, the plaque
was relocated across the street, obscurely placed in the ground of the
central, grassy strip of the Promenadeplatz
frequently passed by trolley
cars. More importantly, this shift required the following subtle but important
amendment

to the text:

Eisner

was murdered

who

"In memory of Bavarian Prime Minister Kurt
on February 21, 1919 in front of the Palais
to say, the less visible site of the plaque separated it

Montgelas." Needless
from the spot of the historic

event (as did the replacement of the original
"this
would have clearly located the historic
words,
building"?which
in
terms?with
site
"the Palais Montgelas,"
the location of which
spatial
was far less clear); both features of the plaque, in turn, undermined
its
ability to preserve the past in memory. The only thing clearly expressed
by the plaque was the continuing local ambivalence toward Eisner's legacy.
As one

labor union representative
the undignified
concluded,
left-wing
of the monument
"on the ground . . . directly next to the trol?
ley tracks . . . is an indication of how progressive traditions are dealt with
in Bavaria."56
The final controversies
over Kurt Eisner and the Bavarian revolutions
location

of 1918-1919

occurred in the 1980s. By 1985, the increasing belief that
the recently erected plaque for Eisner was "unworthy"
led to new atat the actual site of his mur?
tempts to create a more explicit monument
der.57 Initially, however,
the proposal for "a worthy monument
in the
form of a column" made by SPD city councilman
Alfred Lottmann met
with widespread rejection from conservative
citizens groups and an outthe opposition
right veto by the CSU city council faction.58 Underlying
were traditional resentments against Eisner. As the Bavarian Landtag rep?
resentative
and opponent
of the measure, Richard Hundhammer,
ar?
gued, Eisner did not deserve a monument since he had "propagated violence"
and seized power "with a bunch of left-wing radicals, Communists,
and
anarchists."59 Although this conflation of events was familiar, the public
response to the measure's defeat expressed an unprecedented degree of anger.
In a stream of critical letters to the editor in the Suddeutsche Zeitung in
55. "Wo Kurt Eisner ermordert wurde . . .," SZ, 9 November 1976, p. 19. This fear
was not unfounded given the destructive attacks against a plaque dedicated to Lenin on the
site of his former residence in Schwabing in 1970. Alckens, Giesing, 76.
56. Reimund Mess, Das andereMiinchen:DGB-Stadtrundfahrt
(Munich, 1983), 27.
57. Letter from Hannes Konig, SZ, 6 September 1985, p. 20.
58. RMDSS/RP, Lottmann Antrag, no. 819, 20 August 1985; Bauausschuss,24 Octo?
ber 1985, 382-85; Bauausschuss,27 February 1986, Aktensammlung, 497-502. "Streit um
Kurt Eisner," SZ, 27 August 1985, p. 9.
59. "Streit um Kurt Eisner," SZ, 27 August 1985, p. 9.
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the summer

of 1985, local citizens roundly denounced the false remembering of the past. Some adopted the traditional approach of staunchly
defending Eisner's pacifism; others, however, adopted a provocative new
strategy, charging that behind "the outcry against. . . erecting a monu?
ment to Eisner lay the ugly face of anti-Semitism."60
In large part, this
accusation surfaced in response to the report that representative
Hundhammer had drawn upon an old Nazi strategy in referring to Eisner

new

in a letter to Munich mayor, Georg Kronawitter. This
as "Kosmanowsky"
news, in turn, led other citizens to warn against "the acceptance of Nazi
had been the
propaganda" and its timeworn claim that the revolution
work of "foreign elements of mostly Jewish blood." Indeed, in a subsequent city council debate, councilman Alfred Lottmann clearly articulated
the need to stand firm against "the usual anti-Semitic
falsifiers of his?
The
attention
to
Eisner's
tory."61
unprecedented
Jewish identity as well as
the widespread sensitivity toward anti-Semitism
that suddenly surfaced in
the 1980s was most likely influenced by the wave of commemorations
surrounding the 40th anniversary of the end of World
time when the Bitburg affair and the celebrated speech
of 8 May 1985 of Bundesprasident
Richard von Weizsacker represented
two opposing poles of West German attempts of Vergangenheitsbewaltigung.

and controversies
War II in 1985?a

In any case, the new coupling of anti-Semitism
with any opposition to
commemorating Eisner contributed to the withering of resistance to the measure.
Finally, in October 1985, the city council, led by the SPD and the Greens,
overcame conservative objections and ultimately approved the bill.62
And yet, as preparations for the monument proceeded in the period
that followed, the eruption of a new controversy demonstrated the continuing divisiveness of Eisner's legacy.63 By the fall of 1988, the city council's
building committee had approved a design for a monument at the site of
60. Letter from Paul Walter, SZ, 13 September 1985, p. 16.
61. See letters from GeraldEngasser,Paul Walter, Peter Hendl, SZ, 13 September 1985,
p. 16 and Heinrich Bihrle and Klaus Budzinkski, SZ, 25 September 1985, p. 16; "Noch
kein Platz fiir Eisner-Denkmal," SZ, 25 October 1985, p. 15.
62. Opponents had claimed that insufficient space existed on the sidewalk site for a
monument. RMDSS/RP, Bauausschuss,24 October 1985, 382-85; Bauausschuss,27 Feb?
ruary 1986, Aktensammlung,497-502; "Jetzt doch ein Denkmal fur Kurt Eisner," SZ, 31
October/1 November 1985, p. 17.
63. While the commissioning of a monument would take several years to yield results,
unconventional interim measures served to maintain the new interest in Eisner. On 21
February 1986, the anniversaryof Eisner's death, members of the SPD-affiliated group,
"The Other Bavaria,"launched its action "the invisible monument," tearing up a flagstone
in the Kardinal-Faulhaber-Strasse's
sidewalk and burying a plastic painting of Eisner beneath it, before restoring the site's appearance.While the commemorative impact of this
action was limited, it attested to a new impulse to recognize Eisner'ssymbolic importance.
"UnsichtbaresDenkmal fiir Kurt Eisner," SZ, 23 February 1986, p. 19; "Vom Problem,
mit einer Inschrift Zeichen zu setzen," SZ, 3 February1989.
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Eisner's murder. Created by the artist Erika Lankes, a cast-iron plate bearing
the outlined likeness of a sprawled figure (similar to those drawn in chalk
by police at a crime scene) was to be embedded in the pavement where
Eisner had been shot. This proposal, by far the most visually compelling
to be devised in the postwar period, however, soon became embroiled in
because of its accompanying text. Following discussions between
representatives of the building committee and the Munich city archive, it
controversy

was agreed to select the text: "Kurt Eisner, 1867-1919,
prime minister of
the Volksstaat of Bavaria, was shot here in front of his office headquarters
on 21 February 1919."64 In response to this draft, SPD members of the
city council issued a counter proposal protesting that, in fact, Eisner had
been the founder and prime minister not of the Volksstaat but of the Freistaat
as such in the text.65 This point
of Bavaria and should be acknowledged
on the surface, in fact gave significant insights
of dissension, inconsequential
into the conflicting memories of Eisner and the revolutionary
past.
The question of whether Eisner should be acknowledged
as the founder
of the Volksstaat or Freistaat of Bavaria touched upon nothing less than
of postwar Bavarian identity. Ever since 1945, the
the very perception
state of Bavaria had adhered to the designation Freistaat, a term that, like
For the SPD,
Volksstaat, also denoted a republican form of government.
of course, establishing Eisner as the founder of the Freistaat legitimated
historic claims to having shaped the state's identity and enthe party's political prestige. Yet, in a state solidly ruled since the
end of World War II by the conservative CSU, any linkage of its current
political identity to an unpopular independent socialist figure such as Eisner
was bound to threaten the party's own claims to power and thus would
their own

hanced

the exact nature of Eisner's historical role
Determining
in creating the Bavarian republic thus was an issue of strategic importance.
the resolution of the monument's
text was settled not by
Ultimately,

be unwelcome.66

of history. As
fact but by a politically-colored
interpretation
SPD member Alfred Lottmann insisted in an emotional city council de?
bate in February 1989, the fact that Eisner proclaimed Bavaria to be a
historical

1918
Freistaat already in his first addresss to the Landtag on 7 November
him
as
the
founder
of
the
state's
current
established
designation.
firrnly
from mon?
Eisner, he argued, viewed the term as denoting independence
archy; the term Volksstaat for him merely denoted the fact that all "state
authority emanated from the people" and simply signified "a democratic
64. RMDSS/RP, Bauausschuss,2 February 1989, Aktensammlung, 506.
65. RMDSS/RP, Stadtrat, 22 February 1989, 113-44.
66. In addition to having dominated the post of Minister President (except during the
tenure of Wilhelm Hoegner), The CSU has possessed an absolute majority in the Landtag
since 1962. Rainer A. Roth, FreistaatBayern:PolitischeLandeskunde(Munich, 1994), 73.
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of government
distinct from dictatorship."
CSU representatives
a
of
from
the era to show
sources
range
responded by citing
primary
while
well
have
first
the
term
his regime
Eisner
used
Freistaat,
that,
may
the
term
Volksstaat
the
term
instead;
Freistaat, they ar?
quickly adopted
system

gued, entered into standard usage only after May 1919 when the cabinet
of Johannes Hoffmann adopted it to separate itself from the bygone revo?
conclusion that
Zehetmaier's
lutionary regimes.67 Yet, CSU councilman
"one can hardly assert any identity between the republic that Eisner proclaimed and our Freistaat created after the war," elicited sharp responses
from SPD representatives. As SPD councilman Klaus Junger argued, the
elements of Eisner's republic were all to be found in the
distinguishing
current Bavarian system: the republican system of government
(marking
from the "rotten monarchy"), universal suffrage, democratic
and a federalistic orientation. The modern Freistaat of Bavaria,
certainly different from the Freistaat proclaimed by Eisner, had its

the liberation
elections,
though

origins within it. Ultimately, however, SPD mayor Georg Kronawitter's
remark that the choice of Freistaat or Volksstaat would be a "political
decision" was borne out by events. In the final city council vote, the CSU
When at last dedicated later in the year, the new text of
the monument read: "Kurt Eisner, who proclaimed the Bavarian Republik
on 9 November
1918, and the future prime minister of the Volksstaat of
Bavaria was murdered on this spot on February 21, 1919." In denying
was victorious.

Eisner any links to the term Freistaat, the conservative
its protectionist claims upon it.68

CSU

maintained

Although the politicized decision to deny Eisner's contribution to the
discomfort with his legacy,
modern Bavarian state indicated continuing
the resulting monument
nevertheless represented the dramatic evolution
of his place in postwar memory. A historical legacy that had once been
marginalized silently from the cityscape had now acquired a central place
within it. An additional indication of the revision of memory in the 1980s
in the
was provided by a second alteration to the Revolutionsdenkmal
Ostfriedhof in 1989. While the cubic stone monument, destroyed by the
Nazis, had been restored in 1958, it had only regained one undescriptive
text, "To the dead of the revolution of 1919." In 1989, however, local
labor unions marked the 70th anniversary of the crushing of the Rdterepublik
by once more engraving the stone with its original quotation by Ernst
Toller, as well as two new phrases: "In memory of Kurt Eisner, 18671918" and, more notably, "To the Victims of the Resistance, 1933-1945."
Once again, in linking the victims of the "white" troops and those of
67. RMDSS/RP, Stadtrat,22 February 1989, 113-44.
68. Ibid.
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more

extreme descendents,
the Nazis, this last textual
politically
addition offered an implicit message about historical causality. For the
of 1918-1919
remained important as a means of
Left, the revolutions
the larger lessons of the Third Reich. In commemorating
illuminating
the persecution
of the Left by the Right in two different historical eras,
the monument
served, according to union leader Jakob Deffner, the in?
tended

of urging resistance to "racism, fascism, and [support] for
and democracy."69 In effect, the alteration of the Revolutions?
denkmal provided the Left with a site to express its own view of the past
denied to it in front of the Palais Montgelas.
The very need to acquire
function

freedom

such commemorative

parity, however,
to arrive at a mnemonic
consensus.70

attested to the continuing

inability

occaFinally, as demonstrated
by the range of fleeting controversies
sioned by the 75th anniversary of the Bavarian revolutions
in 1993-94,
of memory has continued.
the politicization
The CSU provided further
of its continuing
indications
historical amnesia by the refusal of party
leaders such as German Finance Minister Theo Waigel and Bavarian Minister
President Edmund Stoiber in November
1993 to attend an SPD-sponsored
in
the
Munich
Residenz
ceremony
marking the 75th anniversary of Eisner's
of
the
Bavarian
proclamation
republic. Claiming that he was "unable to
associate the birthdate of democratic . . . Bavaria with the proclamation of
the Soviet Republic by Kurt Eisner," Waigel excused himself by a careless, yet politically
shrewd, misuse of history typical of local postwar
conservatives.71 And yet, in contrast to this display of "ignorance,"
signs
of the expansion of local collective memory have continued to appear in
as demonstrated
erection of an unsolicited
Munich,
by the provisional
in
of
commemorative
honor
Gustav Landauer at Munich's Stadelheim
plaque
prison in late April 1994. Although quickly removed by local authorities,
the plaque's blunt text?"Gustav
Landauer was murdered here on May 2,
1919"?and
the theatrical spilling of tomato juice in front of it by its
demonstrated
a new willingness
to confront uncommemorated
this impulse re?
aspects of the city's revolutionary
past.72 Importantly,
ceived official state sanction in late January 1997, when Munich Mayor
creators

Christian Ude unveiled a permanent plaque to Gustav Landauer in Schwabing
with the intent of "rescuing Landauer from oblivion" and acknowledging

69. "Die Inschrift und das Vermachtnis aufpoliert," SZ, 23 May 1989, p. 15.
70. The naming of "Erich-Muhsam-Platz" in Schwabing in 1989 also represents the
72.
creation of a site for the political Left. Dollinger, Die MiinchnerStrassennamen,
71. Christian Schneider, "Historikerstreitauf bayerisch," SZ, 6/7 November 1993, p. 3.
72. "Mit Verkehrsschildund Tomatensaft," SZ, 25 April 1994, p. 14; "Denken an einen
Ermordeten," Abendzeitung,25 April 1994, p. 12. The monument was erected by the local
artists Wolfram Kastner and Eckhard Zylla.
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his historic importance as an intellectual
75 years, the revolutions of 1918-1919
well as further acts of commemoration.

OF MEMORY

and politician.73 After more than
continued to spark dissension as

In conclusion, the wide range of commemorative acts undertaken on behalf
of Kurt Eisner and the Bavarian revolutions
of 1918-1919
in postwar
Munich

demonstrates both the dynamism and ambiguity of local collec?
tive memory. On the one hand, a dynamic pattern of increasing openness
toward the revolutionary past over time clearly emerges from a survey of
the city's monuments.
The first responses toward the events of 1918?
1919 in post-1945 Munich were limited to eliminating the Nazi regime's
view

of the past through the demolition
of its monuments.
The next
to
commemorate
Eisner
to
restore
older, Weimarattempts
sought merely
era monuments to him; this modest goal, however, was still too radical
for the late 1940s and only was successful in the late 1950s. Gradually,
however, more proactive measures were taken. To be sure, the act of
creating a mere street name after Eisner in an outlying suburb in 1969
was a fairly tentative one; given the popular opposition to it, however,
this modest move may well have been all that could have been expected
at the time. The fact that the next commemoration
in 1973 took the
form of a tangible plaque located in the city center rather than a mere
street name in the suburbs represented yet another advance; however, its
relegation to an obscure site made it fall short of realizing its commemo?
rative potential. Finally, the last monument
erected in Eisner's memory
in 1989 surpassed all previous ones in its combination
of figurative and
textual form as well as its prominent location; yet, it too was marked by
some degree of historical reticence. As indicated
the position of
trajectory of commemoration,
local memory has experienced
an undeniable,
increasingly prominent physical "place" in the

by this increasingly explicit
the revolutionary
past in
if halting, expansion. Its
city reflects its evolution

in local collective

memory.
And yet, local memory in Munich has stubbornly resisted the imposition of consensus. This absence has resulted largely from the tendency of
both the Left and the Right to tailor their views of the past to serve their
own very different political ends. In the process, both have viewed the
Eisner or acknowlpast selectively; the Right has refused to de-demonize
his
historic
while
the
Left
has
covered
edge
accomplishments,
up its Weimar73. "Eine Tafel erinnert jetzt an Gustav Landauer,"SZ, 25/26 January 1997, p. 45.
The plaque's text reads:"GustavLandauer,1870?1919, philosopher, translator,and briefly,
People's Representative for Popular Enlightenment, was murdered at the end of the Mu?
nich Soviet Republic on May 2, 1919 in Munich-Stadelheim, as a radical socialist and
violent anarchist."
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era hostility to him with an opportunistic
and hagiographic postwar posi?
The primary distortions of the past's facticity, however,
seem to
have been caused more by the Right than the Left. That Kurt Eisner
today is still denied credit for founding the Bavarian Freistaat and is still
tion.

by some as responsible for the Rdterepublik attests not only to
of it for
deficiencies in memory but to the continuing instrumentalization
distortion
This
of
indicates
the
limited
gain.
certainly
political
persistence
viewed

educational power of monuments;
although the many monuments erected
in postwar Munich have helped erode historic prejudices, they have not
succeeded in eradicating them entirely.74 And to some degree, this is a
matter of concern. For the absence of a balanced view of the past, after
of the present.
all, obstructs a full understanding
certain virtues may be found in the continuing
absence
Nevertheless,
of mnemonic
consensus. In part, it is precisely because Munich's revolu?
tionary past constantly has provoked politicized disagreement and resisted
to occupy any place at all, let alone an
consensus that it has continued
important one, in local collective memory.75 As demonstrated by the perpetual battle between the Left and the Right over the past's legacy, it
seems clear that the past is not so much remembered
for its own sake as
for utilitarian purposes?especially
the less the
political gain. Conversely,
past is mobilized to serve a particular political end, the sooner it seems to
to fade from neglect. In light of Michael Kammen's rebe condemned
mark that "memory is. . . activated by contestation . . . [while] amnesia
is. . . induced

it appears that preserving
by the desire for reconciliation,"
memory is guaranteed less by fostering agreement about the definitive
"truth" about the past, than by the continual clash of competing views of
it.76 Only by tolerating and contesting
the distortion of the past, paracan the active

memory of it be promoted.
the
of
Finally,
continuing
struggles with the legacy of the revolutions
in postwar Munich reveal that local collective
1918-1919
has
memory
remained preoccupied with weighty issues beyond the insurmountable legacy
of the Third Reich. Although "coming to terms with" the past has, since
doxically,

1945,

referred to the Nazi era, it appears that there are, indeed,

multiple

74. To a degree, this failure reflects a built-in deficiency of monuments which, as many
observers have pointed out, do not preserve memory to the extent commonly assumed.
Whether or not one fully accepts the somewhat cynical views of Robert Musil that "there
is nothing in the world so invisible as [a] monument" or James Young, that "the more
memory comes to rest in its exteriorized forms, the less it is experienced internally," one
must avoid the naive assumption that monuments inevitably preserve memory. Robert
Werke(Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1978), 506; Young, The Textureof Memory,5.
Musil, Gesammelte
75. James Young has addressed this issue in noting that "the surest engagement with
memory lies in its perpetual irresolution." Young, The Textureof Memory,21.
76. Michael Kammen, MysticChordsof Memory:The Transformation
of Traditionin American
Culture(New York, 1991), 13.
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"pasts" that still need to be "worked through." And yet, the memory of
Kurt Eisner and the Bavarian revolutions has not fully been able to es?
cape the shadows of the historical events that followed thereafter. Indeed,
the memory of the era of 1918-1919 has been substantially refracted through
local views of the Nazi past. If only to a limited degree, conservatives
have linked the two periods in seeing Eisner's revolutionary recklessness
as partially responsible for the rise of the Nazis. Much more frequently,
liberals and those on the political Left have also represented the two
periods as connected; yet while they have likewise seen the rise of the
Nazis as rooted in the revolutionary events of 1918-1919,
they have ar?
it
to
that
was
due
the
violent
intolerance
and evengued clearly
Right's
tual crushing of the Left that propelled the Nazis to prominence.
In both
cases, it is clear that the place of Kurt Eisner and the Bavarian revolutions
in local memory has not been an uncontested one.
These two insights, finally, may shed light upon the
the working
of the East German
through
Vergangenheitsbewaltigung?will
proceed. As shown by
relationship to its own left-wing revolutionary legacy,

which

likely direction in
second

past?the

postwar Munich's
and in light of the

fundamental

for the postwar identity of
importance of anticommunism
the Federal Republic, it is probable that the integration of the left-wing,
East German identity into that of reunified Germany will be a painfully
incremental process. Of course, after having attempted to "master" the
Nazi past for over fifty years, the Germans have developed a sophisticated
understanding of the workings of memory; the discussions about the legacy
of the former GDR, therefore, will not likely suffer the same delays getwith
ting started, as was the case with the Nazi past. The confrontation
the East German past is still in its infancy, however. As the recent controversial demolition of many East German monuments demonstrates, the
unified Federal Republic of Germany has only arrived at the point where
its leaders have been confident

enough to east aside the historical views
of the bygone communist regime.77 If the insights provided by the treat?
ment of Kurt Eisner in postwar Munich are any indication, however, the
erection of new monuments commemorating
various aspects of the East
German past (whether to older communist heroes honored in the GDR,
such as Rosa Luxemburg or Ernst Thalmann, or fallen would-be reform?
ers such as Rudolf Herrnstadt) will take longer to realize. These and

77. For a wide range of essaysconcerning the toppling of GDR monuments in the early
1990s, see the entire issue of kritischeberichte3 (entitled "Der Fall der Denkmaler) (1992).
See also Martin Schonfeld, "Erhalten-Zerstoren-Verandern?
Diskussionsprozesseum die
politischen Denkmaler der DDR in Berlin," kritischeberichte1 (1991): 39-43 and Hubertus
Adam, "Zwischen Anspruch und Wirkungslosigkeit: Bemerkungen zur Rezeption von
Denkmalern der DDR," kritischeberichte1 (1991): 44-64.
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promise to be divisive and politicized.
of
the
case of Kurt Eisner further suggests
the
issue
Beyond
politicization,
that the memory of the East German past also will be refracted through
the memory of the Third Reich. As demonstrated
by the resurgerice in
other such future commemorations

the dictatorship of the
scholarly interest in the concept of totalitarianism,
proletariat probably will continue to be compared to the dictatorship of
the Fuhrer.? The East German past will remain in the foreground for the
foreseeable future; but in the background will lurk the Nazi past, as it has
since 1945. For these reasons, the second Vergangenheitsbewaltigung is better
understood as a double Vergangenheitsbewaltigung. Without any doubt, the
past will continue to occupy the present concerns of Germans for a long
time to come.
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78. See, for example, Ian Kershaw, "TotalitarianismRevisited: Nazism and Stalinism in
Comparative Perspective," Tel AviverJahrbuchfiir DeutscheGeschichte23 (1994): 23-41.

